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ABSTRACT
There is some concern that the unobserved preference heterogeneity in random utility max-
imization theory-based discrete choice experiment modelling is an important source of error
variability. The randomness in utility is often interpreted as interpersonal preference heteroge-
neity but it can also be intrapersonal random variation in preferences. We compare utility
maximization and regret minimization-based choice models’ sensitivity to individual heteroge-
neity, examine differences between two consecrated models and validate with empirical illustra-
tions. We use frequency of category (public, semi-private, and private) of bed chosen from Swiss
cross-sectional datasets (2007–2012) to compare two approaches – utility maximization and
regret minimization by applying multinomial logit (MNL) models in regard to the variances in
utility (regret) function, goodness-of-fit and predicted marginal effects (pseudo-elasticity) of
additional payment. We find parameters with the same sign and estimates with almost same
order of magnitude in both the approaches. The statistical significance of attribute effects is
consistent in all variants of utility -based MNL models while effects of different attributes are
significant only in heteroskedastic extreme value (HEV) variant of regret-based MNL models. This
empirical illustration suggests that HEV variant of regret-based models perform better in captur-
ing attribute effects in choice behaviour.
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I. Introduction
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach com-
bines random utility theory (RUT), consumer theory,
experimental design theory, and econometric analysis
(Bliemer and Rose 2006; Hensher, Rose, and Greene
2005; Lancsar and Louviere 2008; Louviere, Hensher,
and Swait 2000; Ryan, Gerard, and Amaya-Amaya
2008). The debate in advancing DCE practices focuses
on the recurring themes of ‘experimental design’, ‘esti-
mation procedures’, and ‘validity’ (Louviere and
Lancsar 2009; Ryan and Gerard 2003). Wansbeek,
Meijer, and Wedel (2001) have argued for individual
heterogeneity at the micro level, while Louviere and
Lancsar (2009) recommend the inclusion of interac-
tion terms in the design and analysis stages of DCE in
addition to recognizing heterogeneity as one of the
many potential sources of choice variability.
A systematic review study by De Bekker-Grob, Ryan,
and Gerard (2012) reports an increasing use of DCEs in
a broader range of health systems – for appraising
patient experience factors; valuing health outcomes;
making trade-offs between health outcomes and patient
experience factors; estimating utility weights within the
quality adjusted life year framework; understanding
labour-market choices; developing priority setting fra-
meworks; and examining clinicians’ choices for case
management preferences. This review has also found a
shift towards statistically more efficient designs and
flexible econometric models.
The DCE modelling applications are based on lin-
ear-additive random utility maximization (RUM) the-
ory (Manski 1977; Thurstone 1927) and the derived
logit model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985; McFadden
1974; Train 2009). RUT is based on the premise that
some components of preferences are unobservable to
the researcher and therefore treated as random
(Manski 1977; McFadden 1974; Thurstone 1927).
Random utility choice models are robust to violations
of compensatory decision-making as well as to viola-
tions of strictly additive (i.e. ‘main effects only’) utility
functions (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). The
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success of RUM models is premised on the intrinsic
elegance of RUM theory, its firm foundation on (wel-
fare) economic axioms (Small and Rosen 1981),
empirical performance due to its strong econometric
foundations, and its formal tractability.
Application of the RUT-based model demands
decomposition of utility into a systematic or explain-
able component and a random or unexplainable com-
ponent. The random component is generally thought
to be capturing all unobserved heterogeneity. This
random component is also interpreted as the research-
er’s inability to capture respondent preferences accu-
rately (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985) have argued that the random com-
ponent captures errors made by the individual in
forming and revealing their preferences based on
their utility maximization process. Furthermore,
McFadden (1997) suggests that the randomness in
utility, usually interpreted as interpersonal preference
heterogeneity, could equally well be interpreted as
intrapersonal randomness in preferences. Thus, unob-
served preference heterogeneity, as an important
source of error variability, limits the application of
DCEs (Louviere 2004a; Louviere 2004b). Hence, it is
being argued that evidence suggests that the choice
paradigm based on RUM lacks behavioural realism
(Hess, Stathopoulos, and Daly 2012).
The developments within the RUM-based
models, which aim to overcome the limitations
by introducing the assumption (1) of fully com-
pensatory decision-making (Arentze and
Timmermans 2007; Swait 2001) and (2) insensi-
tivity to choice set composition (Kivetz, Netzer,
and Srinivasan 2004; Zhang et al. 2004), are with-
out exception less parsimonious and less tractable
(Thiene, Boeri, and Chorus 2012). The assump-
tions subscribing economic axiom of continuity
can be empirically validated with richer datasets,
having an array of situational variables and/or
individual preferences. This study, a straightfor-
ward approach, is not designed to adopt a view
based on certain simplifying heuristics.
The essence of regret theory is that individuals
compare their actual situations with ones that would
have occurred had they made a different choice. The
choice models based on random regret minimization
(RRM) are ‘semi-compensatory’1 and are indepen-
dent from the irrelevant alternatives (IIA)2 property.
The IIA property is characteristic of RUM models,
even when errors are assumed to be identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d).3
Further, the ability of RRMs to display semi-com-
pensatory decision-making and choice-set effects,
like the compromise4 effect, does not come at the
cost of added parameters as with other models that
aim to capture these behavioural phenomena. The
behavioural premise of the RRM model is that the
decision-makers aim to avoid the situation where a
non-chosen alternative performs better than a cho-
sen one in terms of one or more of its attributes and
such premise adds parsimoniousness to RRM-based
choice modelling (Chorus 2010; Chorus and De Jong
2011; Chorus and Rose 2011). The attribute-based
measure of benefit is based on the assumptions that
the value an individual assigns while consuming
(choosing) health services depends upon the levels
of the attributes.
This study is inspired by Boeri et al. (2013)
who recommend that the models based on regret
minimization for modelling the behavioural influ-
ences are more precise than simply using utility
theory-based models that assume the utility max-
imization framework being driver of choices in all
situations.
In this article, we compare the utility maximi-
zation and the regret minimization models in
choice experiments. This article is structured as
follows: the next section presents a concise
1The RRM model predicts that the level of improvement of one attribute that is needed to compensate for the deterioration of another attribute depends on
how the alternative performs, relative to the other alternatives, in terms of both attributes. This implies that when some attribute (x), which has
deteriorated, is equally important as another one (y), which has improved, (i.e. the parameter estimates are the same), and the magnitude of the
deterioration equals the magnitude of the improvement, the improvement in y does not necessarily compensate for deterioration in x.
2The IIA property is described as the ratio of choice probabilities of any two alternatives that is not affected by having a new alternative entering into the
choice set, nor by changing the performance of another alternative in the choice set. By contrast, RRM models postulate that any ratio of choice
probabilities can be, and is even is likely to be, affected by the presence of new alternatives or by changes in the performance of any third alternative.
3This means that errors assigned to different alternatives are uncorrelated, and are drawn from the same distribution (with the same variance). This variance
is usually fixed to π2/6, which indirectly implies a normalization of systematic utility.
4The RRM model predicts that having a (very) poor performance on one attribute causes much regret, while having a (very) strong performance on another
attribute does not necessarily compensate for this (very) poor performance. As a result, it is more efficient (in terms of avoiding regret) to ‘move to the
centre’ of the choice set: An alternative that fails to have a really strong performance on any of the attributes (relative to the other alternatives) still only
generates modest levels of regret as long as it does not have a particularly poor performance in any of the attributes.
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theoretical summary on utility and regret-based
approaches of choice models, Section III captures
description of data and empirical implementation
of these models. Results and discussions are pre-
sented separately in Section IV and in Section V
respectively. Section VI concludes with comments
on performance of these models on our data and
provides direction of applicability of such models
in health system.
II. Utility and regret-based approaches of
choice models
The RUT-based (Manski 1977; Thurstone 1927)
multinomial logit (MNL) model is based on the
assumption that, when choosing, a respondent max-
imizes his/her utility function:
Uni ¼ Vni þ ni; (1)
where Uni is the maximized utility function of nth
respondent on choosing i alternative. V is the
observed component and  is the unobserved com-
ponent of the utility.5 The observed utility function
(linear), Vni ¼ β0Xni, X is a vector of m attributes
reflecting alternative i, and β is a vector of the m
parameter to be estimated. βm captures the slope of
the utility function for the m attribute. A positive
and statistically significant βm indicates a positive
contribution of the attribute to the utility of the
individual. Conversely, a negative and significant
βm suggests that the respondent dislikes the alterna-
tives by higher levels of the corresponding attribute
m. Thus, the probability of individual n choosing
alternative i over another alternative j is expressed
as (McFadden 1974):
Pn ið Þ ¼ exp Vinð ÞPJ
j¼1 exp Vjn
  ; J ¼ a choice set: (2)
The RRM approach posits that when choosing from
a set of alternatives, decision-makers aim to mini-
mize anticipated regret:
φni ¼ R θ;Xnið Þ þ ωni; (3)
where φni represents the regret function minimized
by respondent n when alternative i is chosen, R is the
observed part of the regret, θ is a vector of the
parameters to be estimated and ω (i.i.d.) is the
unobserved part of the regret function.
Thus, the observed part of the regret function
(Chorus 2010) is expressed as
Rin ¼
X
ji
X
m
ln 1þ exp θm xjnm  xinm
   
;
(4)
Here, the observed part of the regret is defined as
the sum of all the regrets associated with the
attributes m between the choice sets of i and j.
θm captures the slope of the regret function for
attribute m.
The estimated coefficients reflect the potential
contribution of an attribute to the regret associated
with that alternative. A positive coefficient for an
attribute suggests that regret increases when the
difference in that attribute between a chosen and a
non-chosen alternative increases. A negative coeffi-
cient for an attribute implies that regret increases
when a considered alternative is compared to
another alternative with a decreasing value for that
attribute. Hence, the extent of the upper bound by
which a unit increases in the relative performance of
an attribute influences the level of regret that is
associated with a comparison of another alternative
measured with θm.
With the assumption that minimization of the
random regret is mathematically equivalent to max-
imization of the negative of the random regret (the
negative of the unobserved part of the random
regret, ωin), the probability of choice for individual
n is expressed as (Chorus 2010):
Pin ¼ exp Rinð ÞP
je Rjn
  (5)
Equations (2) and (5) are both logit-type closed-
form expressions and result in choice probabilities
that are equally parsimonious (Boeri et al. 2013).
The parameters are estimated with the maximization
of the log-likelihood function. The random utility-based
5The assumption is that error terms are i.i.d. extreme values (Train 2009; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The mean of the extreme values’ distribution is not
zero, however; the difference between two error terms that have the same mean is zero. The difference between two extreme value distributions is the
logistic distribution. Therefore, using the extreme value distribution for the errors, which implies the logistic distribution for the error differences, is almost
the same as assuming that the errors are independently normal. Train (2009) has shown that an extreme value distribution gives slightly fatter tails than a
normal value distribution, which means that it allows for slightly more aberrant behaviour than the normal value distribution.
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choice model acknowledges that respondents use a fully
compensatory6 behaviour, while the random regret-
based choice model implies semi-compensatory7 deci-
sion-making.
It has been argued that much of the heterogeneity
in attribute weights can be accounted for by a scale
effect varying across individuals (Fiebig et al. 2010;
Louviere and Eagle 2006; Louviere and Lancsar 2009;
Louviere et al. 2002; Louviere et al. 2008; Meyer and
Louviere 2007). The heteroskedastic extreme value
(HEV) variant of the MNL model with its freedom
from the IIA assumption allows for disturbances in
the utility functions (differential cross elasticities
amongst alternatives). The derivatives and elasticities
of the probabilities differ across all alternatives and
attributes. The heteroskedasticity alone interrupts
IIA assumption.
The general form of the (HEV) variant of MNL
derives from a random utility model with heteroske-
dasticity across individuals, rather than across
choices with an error term as a Gumbel (indepen-
dent extreme value) distribution (McFadden 1974).
The variance ni (Equation (1)) is equal to π
2
=6 but
variance in HEV allows separate variance for each ni
(Bhat 1995). We compare ratios of variances and so,
one of the θ’s is normalized to 1.
Pn ið Þ ¼
exp βiVin
 
PJ
j¼1 exp βjVjn
 	 ; βi (6)
βi is the individual specific parameter vector.
III. Application of models: empirical
implementation
Empirical implementation
To examine the difference in compensatory beha-
viour in decision-making by the individual, we
estimated both the regret minimization-based and
utility-based MNL models.
We have used the cross-sectional datasets of hospi-
talization (sourced from Sekretariat der
Expertengruppe Gesundheitsstatistik, the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office [FSO]) for six years (2007–2012).
Respondents with only compulsory health insurance
with seven selected types of diagnosis – namely (1)
abortion; (2) angina, (3) hypertension, (4) joint stiff-
ness and pain, (5) osteoarthritis, (6) thrombophlebitis,
and (7) varicose veins – are included in this study.
Datasets have been collected from the Swiss FSO,
Espace de l’Europe 10, 2010 Neuchâtel (http://www.
bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/14/03/01/
key/01.html). The administrative datasets made avail-
able for this study contained information on 8.5 mil-
lion patients (approx.1.5 million for each year) for the
6-year (2007–2012) period. For this study, we
extracted 7.6 million records (approx.1.3 million for
each year) representing the population covered only
with compulsory health insurance (i.e. we excluded the
population with additional coverage). The final sample
comprised 776,348 anonymized cases representing the
population with one (or more) of the seven diagnoses
and having only compulsory health insurance.
The patient choices were for the three categories
of hospital bed (public with four beds, semi-private,
and private).8 Although the datasets covered 6 years
but tracking individuals within the available datasets
was not possible; so, we used the frequency of cate-
gory of the bed chosen, the anonymized datasets
were clustered by diagnosis, gender, age group,
comorbidity, and year. Thus, this study covers 155
groups. Table 1 provides the descriptive characteris-
tics of the grouped data, used in this study.
Our dataset was multinomial, level balanced, and
orthogonal with a minimal Db-error criterion (Ferrini
and Scarpa 2007).9 The choice of hospital bed by the
Swiss population with a selected diagnosis is the
6Fully compensatory behaviour suggests that individuals, when trading off attributes defining an alternative, follow a decision rule that allows a positive
evaluation of an attribute to compensate for a negative evaluation of another attribute.
7Semi-compensatory behaviour assumes that individuals adopt a decision rule that does not allow for a bad performance of an alternative with respect to an
attribute to be directly compensated for by the good performance of another attribute. This means that improving an alternative in terms of an attribute
on which it already performs well relative to other alternatives generates only small decreases in regret, whereas a corresponding deterioration of the
performance of another equally important attribute on which the alternative has a poor performance relative to other alternatives may generate
substantial increases in regret.
8The bed categories in Swiss hospitals for elective admissions are: (1) a public bed in a shared room with four beds, (2) a semi-private shared room with two
beds under the direct care of a senior clinician, and (3) a private room (single occupancy) under the care of the head clinician. Swiss nationals with only
compulsory health insurance are only entitled to a public bed. The choice of a higher category hospital bed requires additional payment or supplementary
health insurance cover.
9The criterion refers to a Bayesian design that allows the inclusion of the uncertainty of subjective a priori information (β) on the values of a certain
population b. More precisely, minimization applies to the expected value of the D-criterion with respect to its distribution over β or π βð Þ (in other words,
Db).
4 P. PAUL ET AL.
function of attributem, which are attributes specific to
the individual and the diagnosis. In RRM approach,
decreasing attribute values of a competing alternative
leads to increases in regret associated with the consid-
ered alternative when the attribute has a negative sign,
such as is the case with the cost attribute.
Applying the HEV variant of the MNL model, we
tested the significance of diagnosis, associated illness
(comorbidity), and gender for the regret (utility) func-
tion of the individual. We also examined the variances
in the utility function. The effects of the diagnosis and
individual attributes on the probability of choosing the
hospital bed were measured by computing pseudo-
elasticity10 (Washington, Karlaftis, and Mannering
2003).
EPinxinm ¼
Pin givenxinm ¼ 1½   Pin givenxinm ¼ 0½ 
Pin givenxinm ¼ 0½  ;
(7)
where xinm is the m attribute associated with bed
choice i for the nth individual. Average direct
pseudo-elasticities for each bed choice i were com-
puted as the average for the entire group of respon-
dents with the same diagnosis during the study period.
IIA is a consequence of the initial assumption that
the stochastic terms in the utility functions are inde-
pendent and extreme value-distributed (Gumbel11).
The models were tested (Hausman and McFadden
1984) for IIA implications using semi-private and
private beds as the omitted alternative for the public
beds that characterize the choice model.
Finally, the validation of the goodness-of-fit for
model estimation and the direct pseudo-elasticities
for the RUM-based model was then repeated for
similar attributes in the RRM-based models to com-
pare the effect of different behavioural paradigms on
choosing hospital beds.
Majority of the study population were diagnosed
with osteoarthritis and were female with higher age
group (Table 1).
No systematic trend in hospital bed choice or in
hospital admissions was found during the study per-
iod (Table 2). However, on average the choice for
public bed was the highest followed by the semi-
private and private bed category.
IV. Results
The signs were same for both the approaches
(Table 3). The coefficient values were relatively
higher with less spread in distribution (low standard
error) and significant for RU-MNL models com-
pared to RR-MNL models (Table 3). Examination
Table 1. Data characteristics.
N = 776,348
Diagnosis (%)
Abortion 11.29
Angina 10.71
Hypertension 1.81
Joint stiffness and pain 1.64
Osteoarthritis 58.08
Thrombophlebitis 0.32
Varicose veins 16.16
Gender (%)
Male 36.94
Female 63.06
Age group (%)
19–39 years 13.87
40–59 years 17.45
60–74 years 37.21
≥75 years 31.47
Comorbidity (associated illness)
Present (%) 65.24
Category of bed chosen (%)
Public 66.34
Semi-private 22.06
Private 11.61
Years (%)
2007 17.34
2008 14.13
2009 17.81
2010 18.10
2011 16.19
2012 16.43
Table 2. Distribution of bed choices by year.
Category of bed chosen (%) 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Public 78.01 67.21 64.04 65.5 58.18 64.37
Semi-private 13.47 20.84 22.57 24.83 27.09 23.83
Private 8.52 11.95 13.39 9.67 14.73 11.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
10The classic elasticity measure (Hensher, Greene, and Chorus 2013) cannot be calculated since the probabilities are not differentiable with respect to
indicator variables (the variables in the utility function are discrete i.e. 0/1 variables). Hence, the direct pseudo-elasticity (percentage change in probability
when an indicator variable is switched (i.e. from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0)) is computed to measure the marginal effect of an indicator variable on the
probability of selecting a certain action (Washington, Karlaftis, and Mannering 2003).
11The Gumbel distribution, also known as the Extreme Value Type I distribution, is unbounded (defined on the entire real axis), and has the following
probability density function:
fðxÞ ¼ 1σ expðz  expðzÞÞ where z = (x−μ)/σ, μ is the location parameter, and σ is the distribution scale (σ > 0). The shape of the Gumbel model does
not depend on the distribution parameters.
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of ASC (Model 1) reveals, ceteris paribus, the popu-
lation tended to choose public bed more often than
other category of hospital bed. The RU-MNL model
results explained plausible behaviour that ceteris par-
ibus, the disutility effect was greater (1) for public
bed when diagnosed with angina, jointstiffness,
osteoarthritis, thrombophlebitis, and varicose veins
and (2) for semi-private bed when diagnosed with
thrombophlebitis. Increasing age, all else being
equal, resulted disutility for semi-private bed.
Disutility with year effect was the result of ageing
population. The negative coefficient of RR-MNL
suggested that regret decreases as the difference in
cost between the chosen and the non-chosen alter-
natives increases, because the non-chosen alterna-
tives added more uncertainty in expectation about
the effect of bed choice. On the Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC) test, RU-MNL was marginally super-
ior on statistical fit compared to RR-MNL.
With HEV variant the predictive power signifi-
cantly improved for RR-MNL model. The estimates
of RU-MNL are having different meanings than
those estimated within RR-MNL framework. Utility
declined with increased cost but the negative values
of RR-MNL indicated minimization of random
regret – random regret minimized with decreased
cost implying that the choice of private bed was
associated with more regret compared to public
and semi-private bed (Model 1, Table 4).
Compared to private bed the choice of public bed
and semi-private bed conferred reduced utility when
diagnosed with thrombophlebitis (Model 1, Table 4).
On the contrary, for all the diagnoses under study,
regret decreased when opted for either public bed or
semi-private bed. Regret decreased for female gender
with the choice for public bed and the choice of
public bed provided better utility for the male gen-
der (Model 1, Table 4) compared to the choice for
private bed. The choice of public bed was associated
with more regret and more utility while the potential
contribution to utility and to regret decreased with
age for semi-private bed ((Model 1, Table 4). The
Table 3. Model estimates for the random utility maximization multinomial logit model (RU-MNL) and the random regret
minimization multinomial logit model (RR-MNL) (N = 155).
Model 1 (constant only) Model 2 (full model)
Variables (frequency) RU-MNL (coeff.) RR-MNL (coeff.) RU-MNL (coeff.) RR-MNL (coeff.)
¥ASCpublicbed 0.525*** (0.040) 0.357 (1.35) Cost −0.231*** (0.018) −0.155 (0.616)
¥ASCprivatebed 0.421*** (0.047) 0.291 (1.46)
Public bed Public bed
ageEffect 0.034*** (0.001) 0.023 (0.066) ageEffect 0.034*** (0.001) 0.023 (0.066)
genderEffect 0.173*** (0.008) 0.118 (0.375) genderEffect 0.178*** (0.008) 0.122 (0.369)
comorbidEffect 0.389*** (0.008) 0.266 (0.359) comorbidEffect 0.391*** (0.008) 0.267 (0.358)
yearEffect 0.087*** (0.002) 0.061 (0.122) yearEffect 0.088*** (0.002) 0.062 (0.120)
abortionEffect 0.981*** (0.036) 0.695 (1.244) abortionEffect 1.020*** (0.034) 0.721 (1.25)
anginaEffect −0.167*** (0.033) −0.110 (0.651) anginaEffect −0.123*** (0.031) −0.084 (0.645)
jointstiffnessEffect −0.570*** (0.040) −0.368 (0.60) jointstiffnessEffect −0.528*** (0.039) −0.344 (0.594)
osteoarthritisEffect −0.546*** (0.031) −0.353 (0.582) osteoarthritisEffect −0.503*** (0.029) −0.328 (0.575)
thrombophlebitisEffect −0.337*** (0.069) −0.220 (0.612) thrombophlebitisEffect −0.295*** (0.068) −0.195 (0.607)
varicoseveinsEffect −0.139*** (0.032) −0.091 (0.664) varicoseveinsEffect −0.097*** (0.031) −0.066 (0.658)
Semi-private bed Semi-private bed
ageEffect −0.049*** (0.002) −0.032 (0.069) ageEffect −0.047*** (0.001) −0.031 (0.063)
genderEffect 0.423*** (0.009) 0.304 (0.466) genderEffect 0.433*** (0.008) 0.313 (0.431)
comorbidEffect 0.041*** (0.009) 0.028 (0.399) comorbidEffect 0.044*** (0.009) 0.030 (0.399)
yearEffect −0.047*** (0.002) −0.033 (0.104) yearEffect −0.043*** (0.002) −0.030 (0.086)
abortionEffect 0.234*** (0.042) 0.158 (1.291) abortionEffect 0.354*** (0.032) 0.239 (1.23)
anginaEffect 0.443*** (0.039) 0.303 (0.806) anginaEffect 0.563*** (0.028) 0.386 (0.774)
jointstiffnessEffect 0.125*** (0.047) 0.084 (0.745) jointstiffnessEffect 0.244*** (0.039) 0.164 (0.709)
osteoarthritisEffect 0.123*** (0.037) 0.082 (0.744) osteoarthritisEffect 0.241*** (0.026) 0.162 (0.717)
thrombophlebitisEffect −0.274*** (0.085) −0.180 (0.745) thrombophlebitisEffect −0.155* (0.081) −0.104 (0.711)
varicoseveinsEffect 0.320*** (0.039) 0.217 (0.802) varicoseveinsEffect 0.442*** (0.027) 0.301 (0.766)
N 155 155 155 155
Loglikelihood function −647,417.659 −647,431.86 −647,427.229 −647,441.366
Info. Criterion: AIC 8354.060 8354.243 8354.171 8354.353
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Standard error: Figures in the parentheses.
¥ Alternative specific constant (ASC)12- Comparison: private bed.
12 ASC for an alternative captures the average effect of all factors that are not included in the model. Adding this constant makes remaining error have zero
mean (Train 2009).
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goodness-of-fit for the model with the data was
better with RR-MNL (Model 1, Table 4).
Models 2 and 3, Table 4 revealed the gender effect
on other attributes of bed choice alternatives.
Though the signs of the coefficients were same for
RU-MNL and RR-MNL, the predictive power was
statistically significant with RU-MNL model (Model
2, Table 4). With HEV variant, the predictive power
for cost with RR-MNL improved significantly
(31.95%) compared to RU-MNL and also the good-
ness-of-fit for the model with the data (Model 3,
Table 4). The comorbidity effect was also better
reflected with the HEV variant of RR-MNL model
– an impressive predictive gain for cost compared to
the RU-MNL counterpart and so, also the goodness-
of-fit for the model with the data (Model 5, Table 4).
The sign of the cost changed for both RU-MNL
and RR-MNL variants (Model 2 and Model 4,
Table 4) when gender and comorbidity effect influ-
enced the attributes. Overall negative expressions
(Model, 1, Model 3, and Model 5, Table 4) for cost
indicated that the heteroskedastic effect reduced the
disutility for public and semi-private bed and mini-
mization of random regret for public and semi-pri-
vate bed compared to private bed choice. The cross–
individual heteroskedasticity, when normalized to 1
for private bed, the error variance of RR-MNL mod-
els was larger with gender effect and comorbidity
effect suggesting scale heterogeneity (attribute
thresholds) in the presence of preference heteroge-
neity were better captured with RR-MNL models.
The absolute magnitude of pseudo-elasticities
between RU-MNL and RR-MNL was almost similar
(Table 5). For illustration, the results (Table 5) are
interpreted for RU-MNL as – a 10% increase in the
price of semi-private bed results, on average, 18%
reduction in the probability of choosing semi-private
bed, given the choice among bed categories and hold-
ing all other influences constant. In the context of RR-
MNL model, this 10% increase in the price of semi-
private bed takes into account the level of the cost
associated with other categories of available beds.
More specifically, 17% reduction in the probability of
choosing semi-private bed in RR-MNL explicitly
accounted the levels of the cost associated with avail-
able alternatives (bed categories), in recognition of
regret associated with the inadvertent choice of
wrong alternatives. A 10% higher pseudo-elasticity of
RR-MNL than the RU-MNL indicated accounting for Ta
bl
e
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the possibilities that the wrong choice could have
amplified the behavioural response that conventionally
attributed to the utility-based elasticity.
In line with the model results (Table 4), the
pseudo-elasticities for semi-private and private bed
were larger in the HEV variants of RR-MNL models
compared to the counterparts of RU-MNL suggest-
ing varying behavioural responses to a given change
in a specific policy instrument across the three cate-
gories of hospital bed choice. The choice for semi-
private bed was more elastic in HEV variant of RU-
MNL models.
V. Discussion
We compared the utility maximization and regret mini-
mization based choice models’ sensitivity to individual
heterogeneity. The utility maximization and regret
minimization approaches paradigm of choicemodelling
were compared in regard to the variances in the utility
(regret) function, goodness-of-fit and predicted mar-
ginal effects (pseudo-elasticity) of additional payment.
We illustrated the predictive power of Random Utility
Maximization Multinomial Logit Models (RU-MNL)
and Random Regret Minimization Multinomial Logit
Models (RR-MNL) on the hospital bed choice in
Switzerland.
Our data were having only the universal choice
set of three alternatives. Our attributes were cost,
diagnosis, and comorbidity. We used age and gender
as demographic variables. The goodness-of-fit for
our data in both the approaches was excellent, how-
ever, heteroskedastic variants of RR-MNL were hav-
ing much better goodness-of-fit compared to its RU-
MNL counterparts. Such findings supports Chorus
(2012) who had shown that regret minimization
models on average fit better relative to utility-based
models in the context of revealed preference data.
Consistent with the argument of Zeelenberg and
Pieters (2007) and in line with the evidences from pre-
vious studies (Brehaut et al. 2003; Djulbegovic et al.
1999; Sorum et al. 2004; Ziarnowski, Brewer, and
Weber 2009), we have also found the better perfor-
mance of regret-based models. Although our findings
support existing literatures, settings influence model
performance.
The marginal effects of different attributes were also
better reflected with the choice alternatives in regret-
based models – suggesting that random regret as pre-
ferred representation of behavioural responses in this
empirical study. Such findings raise an important
question of which elasticity estimates should be of
policy relevance. This reflection is congruent with the
argument (Boeri et al. 2013) that utility maximization
framework is not the only driver of choices for the
individuals in all situations of life and also supports the
argument (Smith 1996) that utility theory-based mea-
sures of health do not necessarily reflect the true pre-
ferences of the individual.
The limitations of the data did not allow inclusion of
socioeconomic characteristics of the individual in
choice-set composition nor could this study include
the attributes ascribed to different choices. Thus, addi-
tional costwas the only parameter to reflect the variances
in choice alternatives. The cross-sectional nature of the
data did not allow this study to examine the ex-ante
effect of condition at discharge when many such admis-
sions were repeat episodes for the sample population.
Being non-nested models, the goodness-of-fit was
assessed with penalization of log-likelihood functions
of each models and AIC. McFadden’s R-squared values
from 0.2 to 0.4 indicate an excellent (in McFadden’s
own words) model fit, thus the data were apt for both
paradigms.
VI. Conclusion
This study introduces random regret minimization-
based DCEs to health systems. We have demonstrated
the predictive capability of two different approaches in
modelling choice behaviour. The model fitness para-
meters indicate that random regret-based models per-
form better in reflecting attribute effects. Hence, regret-
based choice modelling does have the potential to cap-
ture significant loss (gain) in choice situations and can
be used as a complimentary to conventional utility-
basedmodelling. Further, in the situation of uncertainty
in outcome prevalent in healthcare services consump-
tion and difficulties in choice making for reasons of
information asymmetry, it is unlikely that the axiom of
expected utility theory remains consistent in all choice
situations. Notwithstanding the limitations of using the
grouped data, this study demonstrates application of
regret-based choice modelling approach in health
systems.
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